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1. Introduction
Of  the two portraits of  Francis Hutcheson that hang in Glasgow 
University’s Hunterian Art Gallery one was painted by Allan Ramsay 
sometime during the period 1745–1746. The other, to a signifi cant 
extent a copy of  the fi rst, and probably painted during the same period, 
was from the studio of  Ramsay. It is however uncertain whether many 
(if  any) of  the brush strokes in the later portrait were Ramsay’s.1 In 
that portrait, though not in the earlier one, Hutcheson holds a copy 
of  Cicero’s De fi nibus bonorum et malorum, a text in which Cicero 
provides a detailed exposition, accompanied by critique, of  Stoicism, 
Epicureanism and the philosophy of  the Academy, the three schools of  
philosophy that were most prominent in Cicero’s own day. The book 
that Hutcheson holds is surely no casual prop in this carefully staged 
performance here portrayed; it must have been chosen to represent 
the philosophical tradition within which Hutcheson saw himself  as 
rooted. And while it is not from the De fi nibus that Hutcheson takes the 
lengthy passage we fi nd on the title page of  his fi rst and most important 
book, An Inquiry into the Original of  our Ideas of  Beauty and Virtue,2 the 
passage quoted in that most conspicuous position is from a Ciceronian 
work very closely related to the De fi nibus, namely the De offi ciis: 
And as regards the things sensed by sight, no animal other than 
man senses their beauty and elegance, and the harmony of  the 
 1 For comment on the two portraits in the Hunterian Art Gallery, Glasgow University, 
see Mungo Campbell (ed.), Allan Ramsay: Portraits of  the Enlightenment (Munich, 
2013), 19–22. My thanks to Mungo Campbell and Anne Dulau for discussion of  
the portraits. 
 2 Francis Hutcheson, An Inquiry into the Original of  our Ideas of  Beauty and Virtue, 
Wolfgang Leidhold (ed.) (Indianapolis, 2004).
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parts of  those visible things; while by nature and reason, man, 
transferring these qualities from the eye to the mind, considers that 
beauty, consistency, and order should much more be preserved 
in our purposes and deeds.3 From these elements that which is 
moral (honestum), which is the object of  our inquiry, is composed 
and created; and even if  this be not ranked among the noble, it is 
nevertheless moral (honestum) and, even if  no one praise it, by its 
nature it is worthy of  praise. You perceive indeed the very form 
and, so to say, the face of  the moral (faciem honesti), which, were 
it seen by the eyes, would produce a wondrous love of  wisdom.4 
This quotation explains the order of  the two treatises that constitute 
Hutcheson’s Inquiry, the fi rst treatise being on beauty and the second 
on virtue. For Cicero fi rst refers to our sense of  beauty, elegance and 
harmony in the visible world, then to their analogues in the world of  spirit, 
and fi nally he notes that moral goodness (honestum) is ‘composed and 
created’ (confl atur et effi citur) from the spiritual analogues of  visible beauty, 
elegance and harmony. On this account, the beautiful and the moral are 
very similar and in some respects identical,  and when, as happens from 
time to time, Hutcheson speaks of  the beauty or loveliness of  virtue, he 
is fully in harmony with the position that Cicero presents in the De offi ciis. 
In section two of  this paper I shall highlight the formidable closeness 
of  beauty and virtue that emerges from Hutcheson’s analysis. Then, in 
the third section, I shall focus on a very different way in which he repre-
sents their relationship, a way directly linked to a cosmic moment in the 
Scottish Enlightenment. To help us get our bearings permit me fi rst 
to indicate the territory that I shall be occupying in the third section. 
Regarding the second of  the aforementioned portraits of  Hutcheson, it 
represents a professor of  moral philosophy, garbed in what appears to 
be the gown of  Glasgow University’s dean of  faculties,5 and displaying 
 3 At this point Hutcheson omits a sentence in Cicero’s text: ‘and he is watchful lest 
he do anything unseemly or effeminate, and watchful too in all his judgments and 
actions lest he either do or think anything licentious [cavetque ne quid indecore effeminateve 
faciat tum in omnibus et opinionibus et factis ne quid libidinose aut faciat aut cogitet].’ 
 4 The translation is mine. The Latin passage that Hutcheson quotes is in Cicero, De 
offi ciis, bk. 1, ch. 4. Hutcheson’s transcription is incomplete. The longest and most 
signifi cant passage that is omitted is reproduced in footnote 3 above. 
 5 However, aside from this portrait no evidence has yet come to light that supports the 
claim that Hutcheson was ever dean of  faculties.   
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one of  the great writings of  the Roman Republic on the question on 
how a life should be lived; and he is portrayed as exercising the art of  
rhetoric, for he is in lecturing mode, his subject being that most practical 
of  issues: how one should live. Hutcheson was indeed a highly skilled 
orator, a fact highlighted by one of  his students, Alexander Carlyle: 
As his [Hutcheson’s] elocution was good, and his voice and 
manner pleasing, he raised the attention of  his hearers at all 
times; and when the subject led him to explain and enforce the 
moral virtues and duties, he displayed a fervent and persuasive 
eloquence which was irresistible.6 
The portrait is therefore a fi tting symbol of  that singular event when 
Francis Hutcheson and David Hume in effect disagreed on the question 
of  the role of  the moral philosophy professor.7 In brief, Hutcheson 
had an answer to this question which would naturally incline him to 
the opinion that Hume was ill-fi tted for the role of  moral philosophy 
professor. I shall be discussing their disagreement, while at the same 
time noting the support for Hutcheson’s position that is to be inferred 
from the writings of  Hutcheson’s contemporary, George Turnbull, 
sometime regent in Arts at Marischal College, Aberdeen, and author of  
one of  the most interesting works on aesthetics to have been produced 
during the Scottish Enlightenment. 
2. Some ways in which our ideas of  beauty and virtue are alike
Explicitly or otherwise, Hutcheson indicates at least three respects in 
which our ideas of  beauty and virtue are alike. 
First, perceptions of  beauty and of  virtue are products of  our facul-
ties, one of  them a faculty of  inner sense and the other a faculty of  
moral sense, and these faculties are constituents of  ‘the frame of  our 
nature’. Our earliest perceptions of  things as beautiful and as virtuous 
 6 Alexander Carlyle, Autobiography of  the Rev. Dr. Alexander Carlyle, Minister of  Inveresk 
(Edinburgh, 1860, 2nd edn), 70.
 7 It may be conjectured that the disagreement between Hutcheson and Hume created 
the opportunity for the earlier of  the two Ramsay portraits of  Hutcheson. For it 
could have been painted in Ramsay’s studio while Hutcheson was in the capital 
seeking to persuade town councillors and others to reject Hume’s application.   
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are accomplished by a natural necessity, and thus without the interven-
tion of  either an act of  discursive reason or an act of  will. These earliest 
perceptions are of  course by their nature uncultivated, but they are none 
the less in place and available for cultivation. Hutcheson has a good deal 
to say both about the naturalness of  our perceptions of  beauty and 
virtue and also about the integral or concomitant element of  pleasure 
that wells up by nature when we perceive beautiful things and virtu-
ous acts. Something of  this line of  thought is visible in his affi rmation 
that: ‘from the very Frame of  our Nature we are determin’d to perceive 
Pleasure in the practice of  Virtue, and to approve it when practis’d by 
our selves, or others.’8 And without resiling from the doctrine that there 
is a rational element, even a very large rational element, in aesthetic and 
moral perception, he does seem to downplay reason’s role when he writes: 
But must a man have the Refl ection of  Cumberland, or 
Puffendorf, to admire Generosity, Faith, Humanity, Gratitude? 
Or reason so nicely to apprehend the Evil in Cruelty, Treachery, 
Ingratitude? Do not the former excite our Admiration, and 
Love, and Study of  Imitation, wherever we see them, almost 
at fi rst View, without any such Refl ection; and the latter, our 
Hatred, Contempt, and Abhorrence?9 
Hutcheson’s curious phrase ‘study of  imitation’ that he uses here 
requires comment because of  the part that it plays in the larger picture 
that Hutcheson paints. The Latin term ‘studium’ signifi es, among other 
things, zeal or enthusiasm, and in eighteenth-century English the term 
‘study’ also signifi es zeal and enthusiasm as well as signifying study in 
the usual modern sense of  the term. By our nature we respond to a 
generous or humane act not only, as Hutcheson says, with admiration 
and love, but also with a ‘study of  imitation’, that is, an enthusiastic 
desire to imitate such behaviour. This interpretation is supported by 
the fact that Hutcheson here contrasts ‘study’ with ‘refl ection’, though 
‘study’, in the usual modern sense of  the term, is clearly a refl ective 
activity. ‘Study of  imitation’, as I have interpreted the phrase, will have a 
signifi cant role in my interpretation of  Hutcheson’s criticism of  Hume.
 8 Hutcheson, Inquiry, 110.
 9 Ibid., 94.
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Secondly, the ideas of  both beauty and virtue are inseparable from 
the idea of  disinterest (as contrasted with self-interest). Regarding the 
perception of  virtue, Hutcheson’s doctrine that benevolence is the 
moral motive – I think the sole moral motive – depends on his concep-
tual point that an agent acts benevolently in willing jointly (1) the happi-
ness of  another person and (2) the other’s happiness for the sake of  
the other and not for the sake of  the agent himself.10 This is not to 
exclude the possibility that the agent who wills benevolently also has a 
self-interested motive for performing that same act. The point is that if, 
having both a benevolent motive and also a self-interested motive, the 
agent would not have performed the act if  the benevolent motive had 
not been in place, then the act is virtuous because the performance of  
the act is not determined by the presence of  the self-interested motive.11
As regards the parallel point relating to disinterest and the perception 
of  beauty, Hutcheson has a good deal to say that is highly consonant with 
the Lockean doctrine that our power of  association of  ideas is a cause of  
corruption, and in particular Hutcheson focuses on our power of  asso-
ciation of  ideas as cause of  corruption of  our perceptions of  beauty no 
less than of  virtue. In that context he presents a prominent case for the 
claim that our ownership of  certain objects poses a threat to our ability 
to make sound aesthetic judgments about those objects. He discusses 
the connoisseur who derives pleasure from his ownership of  an object, 
and whose pleasure at ownership becomes so entwined with his pleasure 
at the sight of  the beautiful object that what he takes to be an unadulter-
ated aesthetic perception of  the object is in fact a perception adulterated 
by its association with his ownership. The outcome is that a connois-
seur of  art may no more be capable of  a disinterested perception of  an 
objet d’art than is a miser who has, in Hutcheson’s words: ‘all Ideas of  
Good, of  Worth, and Importance in Life confounded with his Coffers’.12
Thirdly, though Hutcheson emphasises the fact that our inner sense 
and moral sense are parts of  the original frame of  our nature, parts 
which can deliver up aesthetic and moral perceptions without the 
10 Ibid., 103.
11 Ibid., 103–4.
12 Francis Hutcheson, An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of  the Passions and Affections, with 
Illustrations on the Moral Sense, Aaron Garrett (ed.) (Indianapolis, 2002), 71. See also 
Alexander Broadie, ‘Hutcheson on connoisseurship and the role of  refl ection’, British 
Journal for the History of  Philosophy, 17 (2009), 351–64
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exercise of  either our will or our discursive reason, he none the less 
ascribes an immense role to reason in the task of  reaching aesthetic 
and moral judgments, not reaching them tout court but reaching better 
ones after starting from ones that we believe to be contestable. In short, 
Hutcheson believes both that as regards aesthetics and morals we are 
all on a learning curve, and also that reason is an invaluable means to 
propel us along the curve. It is an invaluable means because, as regards 
our perceptions aesthetic and moral, we are led into error by our unfor-
tunate tendency to associate with our aesthetic and moral ideas other 
ideas that are inappropriately associated with them, and reason helps us 
both to identify inappropriate associations that we have made, and also 
suggests means to nullify the damage that the associations have done. 
Regarding the similarity of  beauty and virtue, there are further lines 
of  investigation that could be explored, for example those relating to 
the fact mentioned earlier that aesthetic and moral perceptions include 
or give rise to perceptions of  pleasure that are by no means accidentally 
related to the perceptions of  beauty and virtue. But enough has been 
said to show that formally aesthetic and moral perceptions are close. 
Of  course one should not leap to the conclusion that they are simply 
identical, for the beauty of  an object is declared to be a function of  
its uniformity amidst diversity whereas our assessment of  the moral 
value (honestum) of  an act depends on whether we judge the agent to 
be acting benevolently. But there is none the less a single, rather thick 
concept under which aesthetic and moral perceptions can be brought. 
Arguably far more unites than divides those two sorts of  perception, 
and indeed given that Hutcheson speaks of  the beauty or loveliness 
of  virtue, he surely believes virtuous dispositions and virtuous acts 
to be characterised by a certain kind of  uniformity amidst diversity. 
Having noted these ways in which Hutcheson brings our aesthetic 
and moral perceptions under a unifying concept, I shall now turn to a 
consideration of  a further way in which he links beauty and morality. 
3. Hutcheson, Turnbull and Hume: warmth in the cause of  virtue
In January 1739 David Hume published books 1 and 2 of  A Treatise of  
Human Nature. At a date unknown, but it must have been in 1739, he 
sent a draft of  book 3 to Hutcheson who duly replied. The reply seems 
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not to be extant, though we do know something of  its content from 
Hume’s own response to Hutcheson’s letter. Hume writes:
What affected me most in your Remarks is your observing, that 
there wants a certain Warmth in the Cause of  Virtue, which, you 
think, all good Men wou’d relish, & cou’d not displease amidst 
abstract Enquirys. I must own, this has not happen’d by Chance, 
but is the Effect of  a Reasoning either good or bad. There are 
different ways of  examining the Mind as well as the Body. One 
may consider it either as an Anatomist or as a Painter; either to 
discover its most secret Springs & Principles or to describe the 
Grace & Beauty of  its Actions.13 
The implication of  this response is that Hutcheson had found fault 
with book 3 of  the Treatise because of  Hume’s failure to promote, or 
to motivate people towards, virtue. Hume’s response, that there is more 
than one way to be a moral philosopher and that one is to be a painter 
and another is to be an anatomist, involves the deployment of  two reso-
nant fi gures of  speech, to which he returns in the Enquiry Concerning 
Human Understanding, where he notes the importance of  the anatomist’s 
way while not at all decrying the painter’s. Far from it, for he points out 
in the Enquiry, as he does also in his letter to Hutcheson, that the painter 
is all the better as a painter for knowing what the anatomist teaches: 
The anatomist presents to the eye the most hideous and disa-
greeable objects; but his science is useful to the painter in delin-
eating even a Venus or an Helen. While the latter [the painter] 
employs all the richest colours of  his art, and gives his fi gures 
the most graceful and engaging airs; he must still carry his atten-
tion to the inward structure of  the human body ... Accuracy 
is, in every case, advantageous to beauty, and just reasoning to 
delicate sentiment.14 
I should say in passing that it is hard to see what Hutcheson would 
13 David Hume, The Letters of  David Hume, 2 vols, J. Y. T. Greig (ed.) (Oxford, 1932), 
1, 32. 
14 David Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of  
Morals, L. A. Selby-Bigge (ed.), P. H. Nidditch (rev.) (Oxford, 1975, 3rd edn), 10.
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or even could object to in this distinction of  Hume’s, since Hutcheson 
himself  was no less an anatomist in his moral philosophy than Hume 
was, no less sensitive than Hume to the fact that just reasoning can 
supply support for the exercise of  delicate sentiment. But Hutcheson’s 
objection was not to Hume’s being an anatomist of  virtue; it was to 
Hume’s ‘want of  warmth in the cause of  virtue’ in a book in which 
such warmth might reasonably have been expected. My main concern 
here however is to note the fact that, in his responses to Hutcheson, 
both in the letter of  1739 and in the fi rst Enquiry Hume is acknowl-
edging the existence of  a discourse, which he knew to be central to 
Hutcheson’s thinking, in which virtue is conceptualised as a kind of  
beauty; and in which it is recognised that just as we are by our nature 
attracted to beauty so also are we therefore attracted to virtue, with 
an implication that part of  the moral philosopher’s task is to win 
people to virtue by displaying or representing virtue in all its beauty. 
By the time Hume was writing about the moral philosopher in 
so far as he is, metaphorically speaking, a painter, the idea of  moral-
ity as having an aesthetic dimension was already at home in the 
Scottish Enlightenment, not only through the work of  Hutcheson, 
but also through Hutcheson’s considerable hinterland, which included 
Shaftesbury’s writings and Addison’s essays in the Spectator on the 
pleasures of  the imagination, while these various writings them-
selves reached back to classical philosophers, including Cicero, whose 
ideas on the beauty of  virtue were part of  the stock in trade of  the 
Enlightenment scholar. So the disagreement between Hutcheson 
and Hume is locatable within an already richly endowed discourse.
Though Hume was speaking fi guratively, a question might yet be 
raised whether one way to be a moral philosopher might be to be a painter 
in a non-fi gurative sense. It may be conjectured that Allan Ramsay was 
being a moral philosopher of  the kind here at issue when he painted 
Hutcheson, tranquil, kindly, and with an open, honest gaze. In support 
of  this approach I wish to note the judgment of  George Turnbull. 
Book 3 of  Hume’s Treatise was published in November 1740 and shortly 
before, in that same year, George Turnbull published A Treatise on Ancient 
Painting in which he argued that one way to be a moral philosopher is to 
be a painter in the literal sense of  the term. So far as Turnbull is known 
at all today this is principally because he was the teacher of  Thomas Reid 
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at Marischal College, Aberdeen, for at least two of  the years between 
1723 and 1726.15 I should like here to take seriously some thoughts 
that he presents in his Treatise on Ancient Painting on the subject of  the 
moral philosopher as painter in the literal sense of  the term. I shall also 
deploy insights that we fi nd in Turnbull’s Principles of  Moral and Christian 
Philosophy likewise published in 1740 and in his Observations upon Liberal 
Education, in all its Branches published in 1742.16 My comments are intended 
to locate Turnbull in relation to the Hutcheson/Hume disagreement.
Turnbull’s Treatise on Ancient Painting is as much a treatise on the 
liberal arts as it is on ancient painting. He does have something to say 
about ancient paintings, but the focus of  the Treatise is on the fact that 
many leaders of  society send their sons on the Grand Tour, and he 
raises a particular question regarding the purpose of  Grand Touring 
– a question he must have pondered often in a professional capac-
ity, for after resigning from his regency at Marischal College in 1727 
Turnbull spent most of  his time until 1743 as a private tutor, travel-
ling with his tutees in the Low Countries, France, Germany and Italy. 
His reply to the question about the purpose of  the Grand Tour is that 
it is to facilitate the Grand Tourist’s education, where the education is so 
slanted as to help prepare him for civic leadership; and the chief  thesis of  
the book is that an appreciation of  paintings can facilitate this educative 
activity. The youthful Grand Tourist, we learn, should be accompanied 
by a tutor whose main purpose is to deliver this education, and who has, 
amongst tasks constitutive of  his role, that of  using paintings as a means 
to instil in his young tutee knowledge of  human nature, manners, virtue, 
15 For matters biographical and philosophical on Turnbull see ‘Introduction’ in George 
Turnbull, Treatise on Ancient Painting, Vincent Bevilacqua (ed.) (Munich, 1971) (an 
edition lacking the plates);  M. A. Stewart, ‘George Turnbull and educational reform’ 
in J. J. Carter and Joan M. Pittock (eds.), Aberdeen and the Enlightenment (Aberdeen, 
1987), 95–103; Carol Gibson-Wood, ‘Painting as philosophy: George Turnbull’s 
Treatise on Ancient Painting’ in Carter and Pittock (eds.), Aberdeen and the Enlightenment, 
189–98; Paul Wood, ‘George Turnbull’ in Oxford Dictionary of  National Biography 
(Oxford, 2004); Alexander Broadie, A History of  Scottish Philosophy (Edinburgh, 2010), 
108–23; ‘Introduction’ in George Turnbull, Education for Life: Correspondence and 
Writings on Religion and Practical Philosophy, M. A. Stewart and Paul Wood (eds.), Michael 
Silverthorne (texts transl. from the Latin) (Indianapolis, 2014), ix–xxvi.
16 George Turnbull, A Treatise on Ancient Painting (London, 1740); idem, Observations upon 
Liberal Education, in All Its Branches, Terrence O. Moore, Jr. (ed.) (Indianapolis, 2003); 
idem, Principles of  Moral and Christian Philosophy, Alexander Broadie (ed.) (Indianapolis, 
2005); 
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and the public good.17 The ancients, we are reminded, used paintings as 
teaching aids for the promotion of  virtue and, in Turnbull’s opinion, 
we could hardly do better than imitate them in this matter. In order 
that the reader should have some idea of  what ancient paintings looked 
like, the Treatise on Ancient Painting ends with a set of  fi fty four plates, 
some of  which were based on drawings by Camillo Paderni, plates 
acquired by Turnbull partly through the services of  Allan Ramsay.18 
Regarding Turnbull’s reply to the question of  the purpose of  the 
Grand Tour, he is not claiming that the study of  painting would be suffi -
cient to instil qualities required for civic leadership – such a claim would 
be unbelievable – but rather that in the context of  a properly delivered 
liberal education the Grand Tourist’s study of  painting would provide 
considerable added value. The very fact of  travelling can deliver up huge 
benefi ts. Turnbull reminds us that often when the ancients journeyed 
abroad they took the opportunity to observe and refl ect on the various 
governments, laws, customs and policies, they met with, and to observe 
also the consequences of  these things for the happiness or misery of  the 
inhabitants of  the countries in which they were journeying, all this with a 
view to bringing the benefi ts of  this knowledge to their home countries. 
Among the things they observed en route were examples of  the 
visual arts. Some ancient philosophers judged certain works of  visual 
art to be impactful in a very practical way. Turnbull reports that the 
philosophers spoke of  the fi tness of  the visual arts: 
to teach human Nature; to display the Beauties of  Virtue and the 
Turpitude of  Vice; and to convey the most profi table Instructions 
into the Mind in the most agreeable Manner. Accordingly they 
employ’d [the visual arts] to that noble Purpose, frequently 
taking the Subjects of  their moral Lessons from Paintings and 
Sculptures with which public Porticoes at Athens, where the 
Philosophers taught, were adorned.19 
17 Turnbull, Treatise, xv, xvi.
18 Though the plates possibly convey some remote idea of  what the originals looked 
like, they surely do not in the least convey what was, for Turnbull, the most important 
thing about them, namely their impactfulness. Their presence in the book is in any 
case puzzling given that, with a couple of  exceptions, they do not fi gure in Turnbull’s 
discussion.
19 Turnbull, Treatise, xxi. 
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The reference to the porticoes, the stoa, of  Athens is clearly meant 
to put us in mind of  a particular philosophical school where paint-
ings were used to instil the beauty of  virtue and the turpitude of  vice, 
though Turnbull was aware that it was not only the Stoics who were 
using such teaching aids. Socrates is also recorded as having lectured on 
human nature to painters and sculptors, and, reports Turnbull: ‘often 
making use of  those Arts, for instructing the Youth in Virtue, correct-
ing their Manners, and giving them just Notions of  moral Beauty.’20 
An art form can be considered in isolation and it can be consid-
ered in conjunction with another art form. This distinction prompts 
Turnbull to note the fact that art forms do in fact often occur in combi-
nation, and when in combination they are often mutually support-
ive or confi rmatory. Especially he writes of  painting and poetry as 
strengthening each other in their effectiveness at forming moral char-
acter. So in considering the education of  the youthful Grand Tourist 
we are to think not of  the impact that a painting has by itself, but of  
the impact it has on someone who has literary knowledge as well, 
someone who has, for example, learned from his reading of  Homer 
the story of  resolution, courage or cowardice that is represented in the 
painting he is looking at, and who is the more responsive to the paint-
ing because of  its association in his mind with the powerful verses. 
By the same token his antecedent knowledge of  the painting might 
enhance his response to the verses. Under the guidance of  a tutor the 
two art forms can become jointly a powerful force for persuasion. 
Whether the story being represented by the painter is factual or 
fi ctional does not greatly matter; the crucial point is that virtue should 
be represented in such a way as to secure the spectator’s moral approval. 
As regards the foregoing distinction between fact and fi ction, the point 
may be put in terms of  a comparison between landscapes and narrative 
paintings. A painter may paint a landscape that is a product of  his imagi-
nation, in the sense that he has never seen a single landscape which his 
painting accurately represents. So in a sense the painting is a fi ctional 
work. Yet all the same it may be believable, and this because even if  the 
cloudscape, the quality of  light, the kind of  plant-life present, the wind-
swept look of  the vegetation, and so on, have not previously been seen in 
precisely this confi guration, they nevertheless form a unity that is consist-
20 Ibid., 14. 
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ent with the laws of  nature. Hence, though the painting is perhaps false 
at the level of  the individual it is true at the level of  the universal. Indeed, 
on this basis paintings could be used to give lessons in natural philoso-
phy. The pictures become, in a favoured phrase of  Turnbull’s, ‘samples 
and experiments’ of  laws of  nature;21 they represent universal natural 
law contracted, as Duns Scotus would say, to the level of  the individual. 
From the point of  view of  giving and receiving an education, the 
conveyance of  universal truth can count for no less than the conveyance 
of  individual truth, and it may count for more because knowledge of  the 
universal can be deployed as a universal major premiss in a syllogism that 
allows extrapolation to an indefi nite number of  cases falling under that 
universal. Knowledge of  universal truths about nature means that we must 
have an idea of  what to expect or at least of  what not to be surprised at. 
Turnbull believes that a similar account can be given of  narrative 
painting, painting of  such a kind as to be no less ‘samples and experi-
ments’ than well-painted landscapes are, though in the case of  the 
narrative paintings they are samples and experiments useful for educat-
ing people about human nature and moral philosophy. Turnbull affi rms: 
Moral pictures, as well as moral poems, are indeed mirrours in which 
we may view our inward features and complexions, our tempers 
and disposition, and the various workings of  our affections. ‘Tis 
true, the painter only represents outward features, Gestures, 
airs, and attitudes; but do not these, by an universal language, 
mark the different affections and dispositions of  the mind?22
The reference in this context to ‘universal language’ reminds us of  
Turnbull’s rather wide sense of  the term ‘language’, namely ‘the vari-
ous manners of  making truths understood and felt’.23 This account 
of  language is offered, not in his Treatise on Ancient Painting but in his 
Observations upon Liberal Education. Nevertheless the account works 
perfectly in respect of  the Treatise, as might be expected given that in 
21 Turnbull also uses the terms ‘sample’ and ‘experiment’ of  Christ’s miracles, certain of  
which may be ‘proper samples or experiments of  the powers, or knowledge claimed’ 
by Christ’s assertions regarding a future state. See Stewart, ‘George Turnbull and 
educational reform’, 99.
22 Turnbull, Treatise, 147. 
23 Turnbull, Observations, 382.
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the Observations Turnbull includes under the heading ‘language’ the arts 
of  sculpture and painting. Part of  his intention is to mark the fact that 
certain paintings not only speak, in a fi gurative sense, of  virtues and 
vices, by displaying people engaged in acts that embody moral values, 
but speak in such a manner as to motivate acquisition of  the virtues 
and rejection of  the vices. In this context Turnbull reminds us that 
in Athens the statues, paintings and monuments of  the city’s soldiers: 
‘conduced exceedingly to enhance the merit of  their valour, and of  
the services they rendered to their country, and to inspire the specta-
tors with emulation and courage, and thus to cultivate and perpetuate 
a spirit of  bravery and public zeal in the people...’24 The paintings at 
issue are therefore being regarded as pieces of  rhetoric, not simply as 
accounts of  virtues but as exercises in the promotion of  virtue and 
the denigration of  vice. The Grand-Touring tutor is to use as teaching 
aids those pictures in which the painter is warm in the cause of  virtue. 
It is appropriate to recall here Turnbull’s reference to Socrates 
‘frequently giving lessons to painters on the knowledge of  human 
nature, that is requisite, in order to imitate Manners, and giving them 
just notions of  moral Beauty’.25 On the basis of  this and other passages 
it seems plausible to suppose that Turnbull believes that the painter 
of  paintings helpful to the Grand Tourist must himself  be not only a 
painter of, but also an anatomist of  virtue, a painter therefore who is 
also a rounded moral philosopher, knowledgeable about the nature of  
virtue and warm in its cause. For Turnbull the paintings on which the 
tutor should focus are moral philosophical texts, insightful about moral-
ity and effective as pieces of  rhetoric, in the Platonic sense of  ‘rhetoric’, 
that is, ‘the art of  persuasion by speech’. 
I conclude that, as regards the disagreement between Hutcheson 
and Hume, Turnbull is on the side of  Hutcheson. The fact that the 
Turnbullian moral philosophy texts are paintings does not affect the 
point. Whether using one language or another, whether English or 
painting, the moral philosophy expounded in the text should be not 
only well argued but presented in such a way as to educate the reader 
or spectator into a virtuous way of  life. I acknowledge that Turnbull 
admires Hutcheson the anatomist no less than he does Hutcheson 
24 Ibid., 399. 
25 Turnbull, Treatise, 13. 
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the painter, an acknowledgement surely sanctioned by Turnbull’s 
description of  Hutcheson as ‘one whom I think not inferior to any 
modern writer on morals in accuracy and perspicuity, but rather supe-
rior to almost all.’26 But it is particularly in respect of  the painter’s 
warmth in the cause of  virtue that the rhetorical dimension of  paint-
ing comes into its own as a contribution to the preparation of  the 
Grand Tourist for the noble role of  civic leadership that awaits him.
I return fi nally to my point of  departure, the fact that the passage 
from Cicero’s De offi ciis that appears on the title page of  Hutcheson’s 
Inquiry contains a justifi cation for the order of  the two treatises in 
the Inquiry. It is out of  aesthetic properties, such as beauty, elegance 
and harmony, that moral goodness is composed and created, a claim 
that surely permits us to ascribe a certain kind of  primacy to aesthetic 
properties on the basis of  a primacy of  dependence. In the absence of  
aesthetic qualities, there cannot be morally good acts. Nevertheless, in 
his account of  the role or, dare I say, the offi cium, of  the moral philoso-
phy professor, the painting that the professor is required to do – his 
bright, lively, ingratiating and seductive account of  the virtues, and the 
darkly hued, sinister, threatening and disturbing account of  the vices 
– all this mastery of  verbal painting is for the sake of  moral virtue. 
In short, these painterly devices, emerging as rhetorical fi gures and 
other tricks-of-the trade of  a silver-tongued orator, are at the service 
of  the honestum. In that sense, we are dealing here not with the order 
of  primacy in which matter precedes form, but the order of  primacy 
in which an end precedes its means. The end here is the promotion 
of  virtue, and the means is, or at least includes, the practice of  the 
orator. There is no contradiction here; just two sorts of  primacy. 
In conclusion, for Hutcheson the aesthetic and the moral can be 
prised apart in the course of  an analytic exercise, and indeed this is 
something that Hutcheson himself  accomplishes when he analyses 
beauty in terms of  unity amidst diversity and analyses moral motivation 
in terms of  benevolence. But he believes that the loveliness of  a moral 
act is not a mere accident supervenient upon the act, any more than 
the morality of  a lovely act is accidental to it. If  it is out of  aesthetic 
properties that a moral act is composed and created, then where there is 
a moral act there also are aesthetic properties; and an act characterised 
26 Turnbull, Principles, 14.
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by beauty, consistency and order will be moral. In short, Hutcheson’s 
moral theory is essentially aesthetic.
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